Is the pricing of sovereign risk linear during bearish episodes? Or can initial shocks on economic fundamentals be exacerbated by endogenous factors that create nonlinearities? We test for nonlinearities in the sovereign bond market of European peripheral countries during the debt crisis and explain them. Our estimates based on a panel smooth threshold regression model during January 2006 to September 2012 show four main findings: 1) Peripheral sovereign spreads are subject to significant nonlinear dynamics. 2) The deterioration of market conditions for financial names changes the way investors price risk of the sovereigns.
Introduction
From the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, the decade-long process of interest rate convergence in the euro-area reversed. Two distinct categories emerged, the peripheral and the core euro-area economies. Aside from Greece, the sharp rise of peripheral sovereign bond spreads and their volatility are hard to reconcile with the underlying economic fundamentals: spreads surged suddenly, while the economic conditions were deteriorating gradually 1 . We consider the hypothesis that amplification dynamics have driven sovereign risk during the crisis. Initial shocks on economic fundamentals may have been exacerbated by endogenous mechanisms. Is pricing of sovereign risk linear, or can we identify endogenous factors of amplification? The answers will help to monitor and price sovereign risk and to curb financial fragmentation.
There is now extensive theoretical research suggesting that the pricing of assets, including sovereign debt, may be nonlinear. Recent work stresses the importance of nonlinear effects and amplification dynamics through the price mechanism during financial crises (Brunnermeier and Oehmeke, 2009 ).
On the one hand, the initial drop in asset prices will be exacerbated if it triggers fire-sale liquidations driven by the deterioration of the mark-to-market portfolio value. Theory suggests that relatively small shocks can imply large spillover effects (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). Moreover, Brock et al. (2009) show that proliferation of hedging instruments may produce nonlinear systems and destabilize markets. Here we test whether the credit derivatives market has amplifed the risk instead of mitigating it.
Previous empirical work has identified non-linearity in the spread determination model for euro-area peripheral sovereigns during the crisis (Aizen- 1 In Spain, for example, the public debt amounted to less than 60% of GDP even by end 2009. The Italian primary budget surplus implied that if interest rates had stayed low, only modest fiscal adjustment would have been necessary to service the debt. Even invoking a broader set of economic fundamentals seems insufficient to explain the sudden eruption of the crisis. Unemployment and the trade deficit had been increasing gradually.
And Ireland's trade balance had been improving at the time of the crisis. But the crisis may have other than fiscal roots. Attributing nonlinear dynamics only to fiscal imbalances, an exogenous driver, is questionable in the light of recent advances in macro-finance.
In this paper, we draw on recent research on financial crises to explore the endogenous drivers of nonlinearities in the sovereign bond markets of euro-zone peripheral countries. We explicitly test three hypotheses. (Allen and Moessner, 2013). So we will examine the effects on sovereign risk of a negative externality due to fire-sale liquidation of assets by testing whether liquidity shocks have had self-reinforcing effects on sovereign bonds. Third, we explore the hypothesis that derivatives produce nonlinear systems (Brock et al. 2009 , Simsek, 2013 by investigating the effects on the sovereign price of credit default swaps (CDS), the most active credit derivative market. Delatte et al. (2012) and Palladini and Portes (2011) have documented an adverse influence of the sovereign CDS on the underlying bond pricing when bearish investors use these instruments to express their views on the sovereign credit. But we know much less about the effects of corporate CDS on sovereign risk. In a down-cycl,e however, their effect on the cash market may feed back to the sovereign risk. To explore this hypothesis, we focus on synthetic CDS indices which cover default risk on various pools of corporate entities, because their standardization and liquidity make them the instrument chosen by investors to express views on market segments. We test whether a rise in corporate CDS spreads amplifies the risk of sovereigns. We compile a new set of financial variables that capture our three hypotheses, and we identify the best candidates explaining how initial shocks to fundamentals may be amplified.
Amplification can be modeled through increasing weights in the spread determination. In other words, the same change in a fundamental has a higher impact on the spread in the crisis period than it had previously. To capture this idea, we use the smooth transition regression model initially proposed by Terasvirta (1996) and developed in panel by Gonzalez et al. Our estimates uncover four main findings. First, sovereign spreads are subject to significant nonlinear dynamics, a result that invalidates linear estimations of the sovereign spreads during this period. Second, the tests reveal that uncertainty and stress on financial entities are major drivers of nonlinearities. The deterioration of market conditions for financial names changes the way investors price risk of the sovereigns. Third, we detect amplification effects in the spreads of the five peripheral countries, with heterogeneous dynamics, that our PSTR approach enables us to capture.
Last, two CDS sub-indices on financial entities are leading drivers of nonlinearities. Their linearity rejection statistics are unambiguously higher than the twenty-two alternative variables. This result may stem from the high leverage created by these instruments. It seems that when active investors leverage their views on credit risk in the financial sector, this drives down the price of sovereigns. The financial risk feeds back to peripheral countries through CDS indices. This result suggests that sovereign bond investors and policymakers should carefully monitor the financial credit derivative markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the determinants of the sovereign bond spread in a linear context and the theoretical arguments for the presence of nonlinearities. Section 3 reviews the existing empirical evidence of nonlinearities in the pricing of sovereign bonds during the European debt crisis. Section 4 introduces the PSTR specification methodology and the test procedure. Section 5 summarises our dataset, and Section 6 discusses the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
The Determinants of Sovereign Bond Spreads Linear context
The government bond yield spread represents the risk premium paid by governments relative to the benchmark government bond. The empirical literature has explored a large set of macroeconomic variables to explain sovereign spreads 3 . From a theoretical perspective, although sovereign debt is notably different from corporate debt, these instruments can be priced 3 Early and influential empirical papers include Edwards (1986), Eichengreen and Portes (1989) , Cantor and Packer (1995) .
by decomposing the risk premium into credit risk and liquidity risk, a wellestablished distinction in the corporate context (Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , Duffie and Singleton (1999) ).
Credit risk is influenced by variables that affect the sustainability of the debt and the likelihood of repayment. For a sovereign entity, these are macroeconomic variables determining internal and external balances, Liquidity risk is related to the size of the issuer, with an expected negative relationship due to larger transaction costs in small markets. In contrast with findings on credit risk, empirical evidence is mixed about the pricing of a liquidity premium in the sovereign bond spread 4 .
Beyond these two theoretical risk premia, the growing influence of global factors on domestic financial conditions shown in recent work (Rey, 2013) points to the potential influence of international risk aversion. Borgy et al. (2012) find a significant impact of international risk aversion on the sovereign bond yield spread in the euro-area context.
While the spread determination model is assumed to be constant and linear in most studies, there is now substantial theoretical research suggesting that the pricing process of assets, including sovereign debt, may be nonlinear. In the following we review the different arguments to guide our empirical exploration in the subsequent sections. We hypothesize that the nexus between banks and sovereign creates a nonlinear relationship which goes both way and features some amplifications. Bernanke et al. (1999) show that an adverse shock to the economy is amplified through the credit channel. The resulting weakening of the economy may affect the sovereign risk in a nonlinear manner. This is more likely to happen when a shock on financial intermediaries forces them to restrict the quantity of credit, and that weakens the economy 5 . This reduces fiscal revenues and raises sovereign risk, which leads to a deterioration of bank balance sheets. Recently, Coimbra (2014) has explicitly modelled the resulting feedback loop. After a rise in sovereign risk, the banks' VaR constraint binds, which reduces their demand for sovereign bonds, thereby raising the sovereign risk premium. This in turn leads to adverse sovereign debt dynamics, which raises sovereign risk. The initial shock is exacerbated and feeds back to credit conditions. Borrowing costs deteriorate further, causing more credit restrictions. Highly-leveraged investors are more vulnerable to initial shocks and forced into credit restrictions to a greater extent.
Although this model admits of quantification that supports the theory, we do not yet have a model of simultaneous determination of sovereign and bank risk that is amenable to econometric specification. In this work, we will explicitly test whether the rise in the risk of the banking sector amplifies the sovereign risk.
In addition, there are specific pricing mechanisms that may drive nonlinearities in the sovereign bond market. The most documented such mechanism is due to liquidity problems implying self-amplifying dynamics in asset prices, because of the negative externality due to fire-sale liquidation of assets 6 . An initial shock on sovereign bonds may trigger a liquidity spiral because it degrades the quality of collateral 7 . Banks facing liquidity problems will be forced to sell off assets to regain liquidity or restore their capital ratio. The emergence of asymmetric information frictions strengthens the dynamics ). The pricing of debt becomes more "information sensitive", and safe assets become less safe, so investors are more selective about the quality of assets they accept as collateral. Their demand for the sovereign bonds that are perceived to be more risky declines, thereby raising the sovereign risk premium. So there is a liquidity spiral: a falling sovereign bond market leads financial intermediaries to fly to liquidity, and this amplifies the effects of the initial price reduction. Relatively small shocks can cause liquidity suddenly to dry up, leading to a major correction of asset prices (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 Given this background we explore the link from corporate CDS spreads to the sovereign spreads and test a third hypothesis: that the rise in corporate CDS prices has amplified the risk of sovereigns.
There are various theoretical reasons why the pricing of sovereign bonds may be nonlinear. In the following we briefly explore the empirical evidence of nonlinearities in the pricing of sovereign bonds during the European debt crisis.
3 Empirical evidence of nonlinear sovereign bond spreads during the European debt crisis 
Empirical strategy: specification and estimation
We estimate sovereign bond spread determination using a panel smooth
The choice of panel data is motivated by the low time dimension of macroeconomic data. The PSTR model allows us to characterize nonlinearity as a function of an observable variable. More precisely, the sovereign spread can be estimated as follows:
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T where µ i represents individual fixed effects, X it is a set of variables that capture credit risk, liquidity risk and international risk aversion and u it are i.i.d. errors. g(.) is a continuous transition function bounded between 0 and 1. We use a logistic function of order 1 that has an S shape:
where q it is the observable threshold variable. The γ parameter determines the smoothness, i.e., the speed of the transition from one regime to the other, and c the location parameter, which shows the inflexion point of the transition. The higher the value of the γ parameter, the faster (i.e., sharper) the transition. This specification allows a smooth transition between two extreme regimes defined by the vectors β ′ 1 and β ′ 1 + β ′ 2 . For example, if we take a threshold variable that proxies flight to liquidity, the higher this proxy, the closer the coefficient gets to regression. We then obtain:
In these auxiliary regressions, parameter θ 1 is proportional to the slope parameter γ of the transition function. Thus, testing linearity against the PSTR simply consists of testing H 0 : θ 1 = 0 in (3) for a logistic function with the usual LM test. The corresponding LM statistic has an asymptotic
Before proceeding to the estimation, we present our data.
Data description
In this Section we present our dataset and sources used to estimate the linear model of sovereign bond spreads and to construct the threshold variables that capture the forces described in Section 3.
The estimation of the model of Eq.(4) is subject to two major data constraints. On the one hand, macroeconomic fundamentals have a low fre-quency (annual, quarterly or monthly), while our financial data are daily.
Therefore we transform all series to monthly data. We calculate the monthly average of the daily series and we transform quarterly to monthly using a local quadratic transformation with the average matched to the source data 8 .
On 
Determinants of the sovereign bond spread
Our dependent variable is the sovereign bond spread, which prices the default risk of a country. It is defined as the difference between the sovereign bond yield and the risk-free rate of the same maturity. For each country in the sample, we use the long-term German yield, which is the benchmark risk-free rate for the Euro area (Dunne et al., 2007) , and the government yield of this country at the same maturity. We rely on daily observations of 10-year bond yields provided by Bloomberg, from which we compute a monthly average 9 . All data described in this Section are plotted in Figure 1 .
A key choice is the set of explanatory variables included in X t in Eq (4).
As mentioned in Section 1, we need variables to capture credit risk, liquidity risk and international risk aversion. We test the following variables: debtto-GDP ratio, deficit, unemployment, unit labor cost, risk, liquidity.
First, the country's credit risk is traditionally related to fiscal sustainability. We include the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit from Eurostat.
We add the squared value of the debt-to-GDP ratio to capture non-linear dynamics that might be due to threshold effects of sovereign debt on real growth. The fiscal data are revised data, necessary because of the presence of Greece in the sample, although these are not the data initially observed by market participants. Other relevant variables are economic activity and the country's competitiveness. We proxy economic activity using the unemployment rate rather than GDP to avoid collinearity with the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Endogenous drivers of nonlinearities, three hypotheses
We construct a set of financial data to capture our three hypotheses presented in Section 2. They represent the set of threshold variables that we will include alternatively in our nonlinear estimations in the next Section.
All threshold variables are plotted in Fig. 2 .
Feedback loop from banks to sovereigns
In order to test if the rise in the risk of the banking sector amplifies the risk of sovereigns, we create indicators of uncertainty and stress in this sector.
• • CMAXFin is an indicator of stress widely used by market pratictioners to identify periods of extreme price declines (Patel and Sarkar (1998) ). We take the five domestic banking stock indices from Datastream and calculate CMAXFin as the maximum cumulated index losses over a moving two-year window with
. The more bearish the market, the closer to 1 the indicator.
• An additional useful indicator of stress in the banking system is the Euribor-OIS spread, calculated as the difference between the Euro Interbank Offered rate and the overnight indexed swap rate.
This indicator must be taken with some caution because of the alleged manipulation of the Euribor rate.
We control for an overall effect of uncertainty and stress not due to the banking sector by including indicators on non-financial in our panel estimates.
sectors:
• Vstoxx is the European equivalent of the VIX, considered by many to be the leading measure of market volatility 13 .
• FTSE300 and S&P350 denote the return of the European aggregate stock market indices
• DomsticIndex is the matrix of the domestic stock returns indices of the five countries in our panel (PSI, IBEX, ATHEX, FTSEMIB, ISEQ).
• RvolGerm captures bond market volatility using the 10-year German government bond index. It is the realized volatility computed as the monthly average of absolute daily rate changes.
• Rvol Nonfi is the realized volatility of domestic non-financial sector stock market indices taken from Datastream.
• Rvoldoll, Rvolyen and Rvolpound are the realized volatility of three bilateral euro exchange rates for the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the British pound respectively.
Nonlinear effects of credit derivatives:
In this paper we focus on the most active credit derivatives, the credit default swap market (CDS). In particular, a significant development has been the creation of synthetic CDS indices which cover default risk on a pool of entities as opposed to single-name CDS. Buying an index is equivalent to selling protectin. Therefore buying and selling the indices can be compared to buying and selling portfolios of bonds.
A buyer takes on the credit exposure to the bonds, i.e. is exposed to defaults, similar to buying a cash portfolio. Investors can express views on a specific market segment via CDS indices. The main advantages of these new classes of credit derivatives are standardization and liquidity, which explain their growth. CDS indices accounted for 43% of gross notional amount of the CDS market in December 2012, 13 We use Vstoxx to proxy the European market volatility, while we use VIX to capture international risk aversion. 
Negative externality due to fire-sale liquidiation
We use standard indicators of flight to liquidity complemented by indicators of flight to quality and asymmetry of information because they occur simultaneously during a liquidity run and strengthen selfamplifying dynamics (as put in Section 2).
• Aaa/10-year Treasury spread denotes the spread between European corporate bonds rated Aaa and the 10-year German Treasury bond. It is a standard measure of liquidity premium, because even the highest-rated corporate bonds tend to be less liquid than • High-yield bond/Baa spread denotes the spread between "junk bonds", i.e. bonds with too low a rating to be considered investmentgrade, and Baa-rated corporate bonds, the lowest-rated bonds considered as investment-grade. High-yield bonds are issued in smaller quantities and traded by a limited set of investors (institutional investors are banned from the market) in comparison with Baa-rated bonds, implying a liquidity premium to compensate investors for holding the less liquid asset.
• 10-year swap spread. The fixed-rate payment leg of a swap is expressed as the Treasury yield plus a spread that compensates investors for the fact that claims on fixed-rate payments are considerably less liquid than Treasury securities.
These variables also capture flight-to-quality because they all include a default risk premium. In addition, the indicator Highyield bond/Baa spread captures also asymmetry of information, because a rising value partially stems from adverse selection problems when investors have difficulty in determining which bonds are riskier than others during financial crisis episodes (Hakkio and Keeton, 2010).
• Flight to quality is also proxied with the indicator StockbondsCorr • The asymmetry of information is also measured using cross-section It is worth making a general comment looking at the set of threshold variables plotted in Fig. 2 : most variables experienced a first peak during the subprime crisis, followed by a second peak due to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Thus our financial series capture two episodes of crisis, contrary to our dependent variable, which is mostly affected by the second episode.
This pattern represents a methodological challenge to detect the drivers of nonlinearity during the European crisis. In the following, we present our results.
Estimation results: Nonlinear dynamics in the
European sovereign market.
We recall that the PSTR specification of the spread is as follows:
for i = 1, ..., n and t = 1, ..., T, X represents the vector of determinants, µ i the country fixed effects, g(.) the threshold function, q it the threshold variable, γ the smooth parameter, c the location parameter. 15 More precisely we estimate a CAPM regression of the daily return on each bank's stock index against the daily return on the S&P Europe 350 index, using data for the previous 12 months. The estimated coefficients are then used to calculate the forecast errors of the current month. Last we calculate the interquartile range for these residuals in order to keep the central 50%. The lower the interquartile value, the smaller the dispersion across banks.
Selection of the optimal linear model
First, we proceed to the linear estimation using a panel estimation with fixed effects. The first step is to select the optimal linear model. We use alternative series in the vector of explanatory variables and select the optimal combination based on standard selection criteria. Results displayed in Table   1 we find that competitiveness is not relevant: the unit labor cost has an unexpected sign (higher labour cost reduces the spread) while the trade deficit is never significant.
Last, in all specifications the unconventional monetary measures adopted by the ECB have a slight significant effect.
In the following we adopt a parsimonious approach and proceed to the tests and nonlinear estimation of specification 2.
Linearity tests: the feedback loop played a significant role
In the second step, we test this linear specification of the spread (spec 2) against a specification with threshold effects. We select the best threshold variables, with the objective of identifying the drivers of nonlinear effects.
As suggested by Gonzàlez et al. (2005), the "optimal" threshold variable corresponds to the variable that leads to the strongest rejection of the linearity hypothesis.
The linearity test results reported in Table 2 In the last step of our empirical investigation, we examine more precisely the impact of these variables on the determination of sovereign spreads.
We consider which determinants have their weight changed most when the identified drivers of nonlinearity deteriorate.
Estimation results: a rise in the risk of CDS financial subindices amplifies the sovereign risk Table 3 reports the linearity test statistics, the smooth parameter, γ, the location parameter c and the residual sum of squares in the three specifications that best reject linearity.
The optimal specification is the one in which CmaxFi is the threshold Therefore, while the five peripheral countries are usually gathered in the same bundle, our estimates suggest that their spreads have a different dynamics. This finding leads us to split our sample into two sub-samples, one including Italy, Spain and Portugal, the other Greece and Ireland. The smaller sub-sample still has 162 observations, which is sufficient for reasonably precise and stable estimates.
We re-estimate the model using the three previous threshold variables in each sub-sample (Table 4) . Linearity is strongly rejected again, but the sub-sample estimates indicate a different ranking from the full sample. In fact, in both samples, CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin best reject linearity (LM =88.2/82.8 and 67.3/61.9 resp), while CmaxFi ranks lower. This result confirms that the individual variable CmaxFi was mostly capturing heterogeneity in our previous estimates (as probably was IvolBank ). In turn, CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin, which are two homogeneous variables, account for the time-instability in the spread determination model. In other words, the prominent driver of nonlinearity in the bond determination model is the price of a corporate CDS index that covers financial names. Now we examine the evolution of the coefficients to identify whether amplification effects have affected the spreads. To do so, we adopt a general-to-specific modelling approach where we eliminate non-specific variables based on their statistical significance and the Schwartz information criterion.
Italy, Portugal and Spain
Results in Table 5 report the estimated coefficients in regime 1 and regime 2 (β 1 andβ 1 +β 2 ) of the bond spread determination models of Italy, Portugal and Spain, in which CDSSnrFin and CDS Sub-Fin are threshold variables.
We examine the transition of the estimated coefficients along the CDS indices variation. Table 5 indicates that the transition from the first to the second regime is sharp (γ = 53.7) and the threshold value, c, representing the switching date of the transition process, is located in autumn 2010.
Our model thus correctly captures the increase in market tensions about the European sovereigns in 2010 after the Greek crisis broke. The spread determination model for these countries appears to have changed radically in autumn 2010 17 . Recall that amplification can be modeled through increasing weights in the spread determination.
17 In the alternative model γ = 2.18 which corresponds to a sharp transition too, see Table 5 .
In fact, our estimates suggest amplification effects that operate in regime 2 through a stronger influence on the spread of all macroeconomic determinants: debt, fiscal balance and unemployment as well as the international
In other words, when the price of the sub-index iTraxx CDSSnrFin deteriorates and exceeds 135.7 bp, the weight of these fundamentals increases in the determination model, so the shocks to fundamentals have more effect on the bond spread. In turn, the influence of liquidity is ambiguous because the coefficients of both variables capturing liquidity show two contrary movements in regime 2 : we find a stronger negative influence of the relative stock of outstanding debt (implying that a deterioration of liquidity affects the spread more in regime 2 than in regime 1), while the influence of the bid-ask spread is lower in the second regime
implying that a rise in the bid-ask spread affects the spread less in regime 2). In addition, we observe that the sign on unit labor cost is contrary to the expected sign, as in the linear estimates (see Table 1 ) 18 . Last, we observe that the influence of the SMP program has not changed during the crisis and remains slight.
To check the robustness of our estimates, we proceed to alternative estimates. First, overall amplification effects are confirmed when Cmax Fin is used as a threshold variable in an alternative specification (see Table 6 ) 19 .
Second, financial CDS and sovereign bonds may price the same information, which would raise an endogeneity bias due to simultaneity. To address this, we re-estimate our optimal model by lagging the threshold variable.
Linearity is rejected with a similar statistic (LM = 63.2 versus 62 in the core estimate), and amplification effects are confirmed. Last, we check that our nonlinearity finding does not result from omitting the CDS index as an explanatory variable. Our results are not affected by the introduction of 18 As in the linear estimates, models excluding this variable have a lower RSS, so we decide to keep it in the vector of explanatory variables. 19 We observe that the combined influence of debt and squared debt increases in regime the CDS index in the specification, a result that confirms that this variable nonlinearly affects the sovereign bond pricing 20 .
Greece and Ireland
Results of the second sub-sample including Greece and Ireland are reported in Table 7 . The slope parameter is low (γ = 0.43), and this transition occurs in autumn 2010, consistently with the previous sub-sample 21 .
Amplification effects also operate through a stronger influence of unemployment. The effects of debt and squared debt are contradictory and compensate for each other. The effects of the VIX and of the bid-ask spread are positive, as expected, but they remain stable in the second regime, contrary to the previous sub-sample. As in the previous sub-sample and in the linear estimate, the unit labor cost has the same unexpected sign. Last, contrary to the previous sample, we observe that the SMP has a negative effect on the spread in the second regime (β ′ 1 +β ′ 2 < 0). In other words, our estimates suggest that the bond purchases carried out by the ECB have counterbalanced amplification effects on the bond spreads of Greece and Ireland. Similarly to the previous panel, we have proceeded to alternative estimates displayed in Table 8 . Model 1 confirms the stronger influence of debt and unemployment and indicates a stronger influence of liquidity, a result not uncovered in the core estimates. The downward influence of the SMP is confirmed too.
Thus the spread determination model changed during the crisis, and amplification effects are detected in both sub-panels, where initial shocks on fundamentals are exacerbated when the price of financial CDS sub-indices increases. The higher the CDS price, the more risk-averse are investors towards the peripheral countries. Figure 2 , which plots the evolution of both 20 Results available on request. 21 The lower slope parameter may indicate a slower transition than in the previous subsample but it is also important to note that the transition speed depends on γ and the distance between the threshold variable and the threshold parameter c. The fact that CDS indices increase strongly during the crisis implies that the transition from one regime to the other is fairly fast, as in the other sub-sample.
financial CDS sub-indices, shows that their prices experience a first peak due to the subprime crisis and then rise progressively to reach a second peak, significantly higher in 2012, when peripheral sovereign risk holdings of European banks put the entire euro system at risk.
We mentioned in Section 2 that high leverage enhances the amplification of the initial correction. Recall that the up-front principal in buying CDS indices is small or zero, implying a high leverage created by these instruments. This result suggests that sovereign bond investors should carefully monitor the credit derivative market. Note: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level. Notes: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***):
significant at the 1% level. Notes: (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***):
significant at the 1% level. 0.053 * * * Notes: The T-stat in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.β 1 and β 2 correspond to the coefficient in Eq (11). β 1 is the coefficient in the first extreme regime . The coefficient in the second extreme regime is β 1 + β 2 . Notes: The T-stat in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at the 5% level and (***): significant at the 1% level.β 1 and β 2 correspond to the coefficient in Eq (11). β 1 is the coefficient in the first extreme regime . The coefficient in the second extreme regime is β 1 + β 2 .
